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This paper is devoted to an extension of Dibooglu and Kutan’s work [Journal
of Comparative Economics, June 2001], in two directions.  First, a bivariate VAR,
including the real effective exchange rate (REER) and inflation, is tested not only
for Hungary and Poland, but also for the Czech Republic, over the 1993:1-2002:12
time-period, which excludes the early transition years.  Second, industrial production
and the nominal interest rate are incorporated in a multivariate VAR to investigate
the effects of policy shocks on the exchange rate.  This helps to illustrate the
possible gains and costs of the present exchange-rate regime in these CEECs and
to draw some conclusions on the likely economic outcomes of adopting a firmly
fixed exchange-rate regime like ERM II.  Three main conclusions emerge: (1)
contrary to Dibooglu and Kutan (2001), results testify to a high degree of flexi-
bility in the CPI; (2) in contrast to the Czech Republic and Hungary, nominal shocks
have a strong effect on the REER in Poland and, more specifically, there is evidence
that the fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate explain a large part of REER
fluctuations in this latter country; (3) in Poland, the policy mix seems more credible
than in the other two countries.  We infer from these conclusions that moving to
the ERM II and the EU will be of less benefit to Poland than to the Czech Republic
and Hungary.
JEL classifications: C50, E63, F31, P22
T he entry of eight Central and Eastern European countries(CEECs) in the European Union (EU) in May 2004 is animportant new step towards full integration within Europe.
Though effective integration is already achieved in most of these CEECs,
issues arise on the capacity of the new entrants to overcome the loss
of monetary independence and control over exchange-rate policy and
to satisfy the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)1.  Indeed, once entry in
the EU is an accomplished fact, the exchange rate of acceding countries
becomes of “common concern”.  Moreover, new entrants in the EU
will have to join EMU sooner or later.  On the way, they will have to
participate in the so-called ERM-II (a fixed but adjustable exchange-rate
regime, with fluctuation bands of presumably +/-15%) for at least two
years.  As regards the SGP, any EU member will need to ensure that
actual deficits remain below the 3% GDP threshold in times of “normal”
economic downturns (i.e. that the cyclically-adjusted budget balances
are compatible with the 3% threshold for actual deficits also during
below-potential growth periods).  Anyway, a 3% GDP threshold for
deficits is a nominal convergence criterion that new Member States of
EU will have to respect in order to join EMU.
In this paper, we intend to shed light on the economic policies of
the largest newcomers, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
These three countries have moved from a fixed to a more flexible
exchange-rate regime during the transition process, and have recently
adopted inflation-targeting monetary policies.  Since flexible exchange
rates and inflation-targeting strategies are not characteristics of the EU
or the Euro area, this obviously questions the ability of these countries
to move back to a quasi-fixed exchange rate and a common monetary
policy.  Moreover, as will appear clearer in the last section of the paper,
fiscal policy has been extensively used by the authorities of the three
countries in the past few years, largely to sustain growth.
The analysis is focused on the degree of price flexibility in the three
countries, and on the explanations of the variations in the real exchange
rate.  More specifically, we try to determine the extent to which these
countries have managed the exchange rate in order to compensate for
exogenous shocks or as a growth-oriented tool.  In this regard, we first
base ourselves on a paper by Dibooglu and Kutan (2001) [D-K (2001),
hereafter] as well as on the in-depth analysis of Halpern and Wyplosz
(1997).  The latter authors showed that the persistent real-exchange-
rate appreciation in transition economies could be attributable, first, to
initial undervaluation and, second, to the rapid gains in efficiency once
markets have been in a position to drive prices and allocation of
resources has been improved.
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1. On this topic, see Coricelli and Ercolani (2002) and Coricelli in the present Issue.
As for D-K (2001), they use a structural VAR model of the real
effective exchange rate (REER) and the price level which makes it
possible to analyse the extent to which price flexibility has improved in
Hungary and Poland since the beginning of the transition process.
Decomposing real-exchange-rate and price movements into those
attributable to real and nominal shocks is also useful to assess the effec-
tiveness of monetary and exchange-rate policies in these transition
economies.  As noted by D-K (2001), a large temporary component
in the real exchange rate due to nominal shocks could indicate a high
degree of nominal rigidity in commodity prices; hence some scope for
exchange-rate policy as the latter may impair competitiveness.  
We extend D-K (2001) in two respects.  First, we study a third
country, the Czech Republic, whose monetary and exchange-rate frame-
works have been somewhat similar to those of Hungary and Poland.
The most important difference between these three countries is the
timing of reform.  A more flexible exchange-rate regime was adopted
as early as 1996 in the Czech Republic (larger bands), but only in 2000
and 2001 in Hungary and Poland respectively.  Inflation targeting was
adopted in 1998 in the Czech Republic and Poland, but only in 2001
in Hungary.  
Second, D-K (2001) consider that the real shocks in their study could
be attributable to changes in endowment, productivity and technology.
These are typically supply shocks.  Nominal shocks are caused mainly
by non-expected variations in the nominal exchange rate or money
growth.  These are nominal demand shocks.  However, as Canzoneri
et al. (1996) argue, questioning the relevance of adopting a common
currency, within the framework of the optimum currency area liter-
ature, necessitates consideration of more types of shocks.  We
therefore extend the decomposition by D-K (2001) to real demand
shocks, thus incorporating industrial production2, and to financial
shocks, hence incorporating the nominal interest rate, both within the
structural VAR model.  Real demand shocks would reflect an
unexpected change in policy, for instance a change in public spending.
A large, persistent and positive component in industrial production due
to a fiscal shock may thus reveal the future cost of implementing fiscal
policy within the limits of the SGP.  Now, a country experiencing
misguided monetary policy innovations and/or speculative currency
attacks (i.e. financial shocks) would be better-off within a monetary
union than under a flexible exchange-rate regime.  Moreover, adopting
a multivariate decomposition incorporating economic policies helps to
answer the following question: do exchange rates move only in
response to shocks that cause national or international macroeconomic
imbalances?  The answer may be that they do not.  The REER upward
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2. Owing to the unavailability of GDP on a monthly basis, we have used industrial production
as a proxy.
trend observed for CEECs since the beginning of the transition period
may be partly due to noise and speculation, alongside the mere funda-
mentals of the economy.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 1 briefly
provides an overview of macroeconomic policies in the three countries.
Section 2 is devoted to the presentation of the data and of the method-
ology used.  Section 3 presents empirical results ensuing from the
structural bivariate model.  Section 4 introduces and discusses further
results.  Section 5 concludes and discusses policy implications of the
empirical outcomes.
1. Economic policies in the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland 
During the period under study (1993–2002), the three countries
were characterised by a shift from a fixed-exchange-rate regime to a
more flexible regime and by a shift from money supply targeting to
inflation targeting.  Of course, these two shifts were not independent
of each other.  
In the beginning of the transition period, a fixed-exchange-rate
regime was adopted in most post-socialist countries as a nominal anchor
for stabilisation purposes.  Indeed, two-digit– or even three-digit–
inflation rates were the rule (Arratibel et al., 2002).  Though the shifts
in exchange-rate regime and monetary policy frameworks might be
related to country-specific factors, capital inflows with a fixed exchange
rate– leading to a real-exchange-rate appreciation, which in turn resulted
in a significant loss of competitiveness and a worsening of the current
account– might be the common story to explain the subsequent shift
to a more flexible exchange-rate regime over the most recent years.  
1.1. The Czech Republic
In 1990, the 50% devaluation of the currency allowed the Czech
Republic to return quite rapidly to growth but, at the same time, it
delayed restructuring of the economy.  As a result, the Czech Republic
was precipitated into a currency crisis in the spring of 1997, necessi-
tating the introduction of two stabilisation packages in April and May
1997.  The roots of the crisis were in fact to be found mainly in the
state-controlled banks that provided easy access to credit, in largely
unregulated capital markets and in confused corporate governance.  In
such an environment, domestic firms failed to restructure and lost
competitiveness, the result being a mounting external imbalance (see
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Table 1).  Despite rising interest rates, these developments forced the
authorities to abandon the fixed-exchange-rate regime in May 1997 in
favour of a managed float against the DM, and to introduce several
macroeconomic and structural measures, including a tightening of fiscal
policy, a moderation of nominal wage growth, a substantial increase in
regulated prices and plans for the rapid completion of the privatisation
of both the banking sector and a number of state-controlled firms
(Krkoska, 2001).  Moreover, a few months later, in December 1997,
the Czech National Bank (CNB) decided to adopt an inflation-targeting
framework.
The combination of monetary and fiscal restraints contributed to a
slowdown of GDP growth that set the stage for the recession of 1997-
1998.  Indeed, GDP fell by 0.8% in 1997 and 1.0% in 1998, mainly as
a result of falling domestic demand.  By closing the gap between the
economy’s aggregate supply and demand, the recession contributed to
correcting the external imbalance.  Imports declined, owing to the
depressed state of the economy, and exports recovered in response
to the improved competitiveness associated with the 1997 depreciation
of the currency, so that the current-account deficit shrank to 2.4% of
GDP in 1998.  The drop in output, combined with nominal wage
moderation, declines in food and energy prices and a pause in the
process of price liberalisation, led to a substantial reduction in inflation,
which fell from 10.7% in 1998 to 2.1% in 1999.  
Admittedly, inflation picked up again somewhat in 2000 and 2001
under the effect of GDP growth and a reversal in the other afore-
mentioned factors.  At the same time, it also gained from the change
in the monetary policy framework.  The CNB succeeded in convincing
the public that the acceleration in inflation was to a large extent due
to the disappearance of exceptional factors (lower food and energy
prices), so that no wage-inflation spiral was engaged.  In the course of
2001, to operate even more efficiently on inflation expectations, the
CNB changed the basis for its inflation target from net inflation– which
excludes variations in indirect taxes and regulated prices– to the CPI.
While the appreciation of the Czech Koruna, due to strong capital
inflows, certainly contributed to a decrease in inflation, this target
change also explains the low increase in the CPI (+1.8%) while
permitting a low nominal interest rate (1.8%) in 2002 (Table 1).  
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As regards fiscal policy, the goals of the Czech government changed
dramatically in the late 1990s (Matalík and Slavik, 2003).  From 1993
to 1998, fiscal policy was aimed at achieving a balanced budget and a
reduction of the state’s role in the economy.  A target of zero-increase
in public debt was explicitly set by the government.  Up to 1998, the
general government deficit was below 2% of GDP and the public debt
was decreasing to reach 13% of GDP (Table 1).  From 1998 to the
present, on the contrary, fiscal policy has been directed at strength-
ening the state’s stabilising role in the economy, culminating in 2002
when the government openly opted for promoting economic growth
by means of public budget deficits.  One of the direct results of this
shift has been a substantial rise in public debt, which is expected to
reach 30% of GDP in 2003 (European Commission, 2003).  Increasing
deficits are mainly due to high social transfers, investments in infra-
structure and housing, and lower revenues in the early 2000s
consecutive to the recession in 1998-99.  Moreover, the budgetary
position of the Czech Republic has for some years been considerably
burdened by restructuring measures designed to tackle profound crises
in the banking sector, whose cumulative costs amount to around 20%
of GDP (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2003)3.  EU entry and the impending
adoption of the SGP may not give enough leeway to cope with a
recession, via the automatic stabilisers, or to implement an ambitious
public investment programme.  Indeed, the shift in fiscal policy since
1998 has resulted in increasing mandatory state budget expenditures
(i.e. expenditures predetermined by legislation and by binding agree-
ments).  In a wider concept, alongside pensions, sickness benefits and
social security benefits, this includes wages of state employees,
investment projects in progress, all these making up around 85% of all
state expenditures in 2002 against around 76% in 1997 (Matalík and
Slavik, 2003).  This will severely limit the government’s ability to
implement contra-cyclical fiscal policy in the future (Matalík and Slavik,
2003, CNB, 2003).
1.2. Hungary
At the beginning of the transition period, Hungarian monetary policy
included active exchange-rate management based on a currency peg
with a narrow band of permitted fluctuations.  However, this initial
monetary policy, which aimed at a real appreciation of the Forint to
help to curb domestic inflation, was rapidly found to be too costly
because of the declining competitiveness of Hungarian exports and
sluggish growth (D-K, 2001).  Moreover, it failed to provide a nominal
exchange-rate anchor to reduce inflationary expectations (see Table 2).
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3. The measures are being financed largely by privatisation proceeds, which are not reflected
in the deficits, although they are reducing the government gross debt.
These costs began to appear in 1993/94, when current-account and
government deficits reached 9% and 7% of GDP respectively.  The
persistence of the twin deficits led to a macroeconomic situation that
was certainly not sustainable in the long run.  Foreign debt was growing
steadily, putting Hungary at risk of insolvency.  In such a macroeco-
nomic context, liberalisation of foreign exchange-rate operations,
combined with concerns by foreign creditors about the stability of the
Forint, resulted in a period of strong macroeconomic vulnerability in
March 1995, necessitating the implementation of extensive stabilisation
measures and a shift in the exchange-rate regime (Szapary and Jakab,
1998; Krkoska, 2001).  Fiscal policy was tightened to reduce the twin
deficits through lower government expenditures, higher import tariffs,
and reduced government borrowing.  In order to restore investors’
confidence, the Forint was devaluated by 9% and a pre-announced
crawling-band exchange-rate system was introduced in March 1995.
The band of permitted fluctuations was set at 2.25% on either side of
the parity and was maintained until May 2001.  The rate of crawl was
set according to an inflation target.  The initial monthly rate was 1.9%,
being gradually reduced to 0.2% in April 2001.  
Following the package of stabilisation measures, the government and
current-account deficits were reduced (Table 2).  Economic growth
slowed shortly after the March 1995 measures had been implemented,
but then soon accelerated.  Inflation declined steadily, in part because
of falling import prices and also to the slowing rate of depreciation of
the forint.  Nevertheless, up to 2000, the CPI-based inflation rate came
close to 10% again (Table 2).  
In May 2001, the Hungarian central bank changed the monetary
regime from a crawling-band exchange rate to an inflation-targeting
framework.  The central bank widened the exchange-rate fluctuation
margins to +/-15%, hoping for an appreciation of the Forint to achieve
the inflation targets.  Though inflation halved (falling from 9.2% to 5.3%),
two years of experience in Hungary with inflation targeting has
highlighted the fact that the disinflationary effect of exchange-rate
appreciation might be somewhat smaller than originally expected by the
central bank.  According to Jakab and Kovacs (2003), private-sector
wages have not yet adjusted to the lower level of inflation, and most
of the adjustment has taken place in employment (mostly in the
manufacturing sector)4.  
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4. More precisely, their decomposition of exchange rate pass-through underlines the impor-
tance– and timing– of different markets in the Hungarian disinflation process.  They found that
“the quickest disinflationary effect comes from the permanent decrease in import prices.  However,
the adjustment process does not end here.  The narrowing of the output gap (mark-up effect)
helps in further disinflation.  Lastly, labour market adjustment becomes a significant determinant
in the exchange rate pass-through from year three and onward.  This might happen as wage
adjustment can be achieved via an increasing unemployment rate after the slowdown in GDP due
to the real exchange rate channel.  This result explains why companies reduce employment first
and adjust wages only later” ( Jakab and Kovacs, 2003, p.5).
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Finally, after several changes in the currency basket during the 1990s,
reducing the weight of the US dollar (and increasing the weight of the
ECU or DM), the exchange rate has been completely tied to the Euro
since January 2000.  In October 2001, the Forint has been introduced
in a purely +/-15% fixed band with the Euro: the pre-announced deval-
uation has stopped and the rate of daily devaluation is now nil.  By
most of its aspects, Hungary’s exchange-rate regime now currently
mimics ERM II.  The behaviour of the Forint exchange rate over the
past year shows how the sustainability of such a regime might be difficult
to achieve, and that it might be especially costly in terms of interest
rate manipulation5.
Unlike the Czech Republic (but like Poland), no break in the conduct
of fiscal policy has been observed over the past few years for the
Hungarian economy.  However, the fiscal deficit has increased signifi-
cantly since the new millennium, culminating at 9.2% in 2002.  Granted,
such a high government deficit is attributable to one-off measures and
reclassifications of budget items amounting to some 3% of GDP, which
are then not expected to feed through to the ongoing budgets.
Nevertheless, two main factors are likely to put a strain on the budget
for some time to come: public-sector wage hikes resulting from the
Parliamentary elections of April 2002 and the pursuit of investment and
subsidy plans, launched by the previous government.  As a result, in
the next few years, the fiscal deficit might be difficult to curb.  The
public debt growth observed since last year could then continue,
exceeding the 60% of GDP threshold in the very near future (European
Commission, 2003) and perhaps pushing up interest rates to high levels.  
1.3 Poland
The stabilisation of the Polish economy began under less favourable
conditions than those found in Hungary (D-K, 2001).  In particular, the
inflation rate was very high and difficult to curb.  The Zloty was
devalued by almost 50% in January 1990 and by 17% in May 1991.
Nevertheless, as high inflation was continuing, the competitiveness of
Polish exports was reduced and the current account worsened.  The
Zloty’s peg was abandoned in October 1991, replaced by a crawling
peg with a pre-announced devaluation of 1.8% per month against a
basket of currencies.  Over time, the rate of depreciation has been
reduced and there have also been one-off devaluations and revalua-
tions to accommodate exogenous shocks.  In 1995, the band within
which the Zloty could fluctuate was widened to +/-7%.  Poland’s
exchange-rate policy was so credible to foreign investors that short-
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5. The reader is referred to Levasseur (2004) in the present Issue for a description of Forint
exchange rate behaviour since October 2002.
term capital inflows began to be a problem for the National Bank of
Poland (NBP).  By 1995, despite NBP sterilisation, capital inflows
amounted to 59% of the growth in the money supply (D-K, 2001).  As
a result, controlling the money supply became more and more difficult
for the monetary authorities.  The task was also complicated by the
progressive vanishing of a stable and predictable correlation between
the monetary aggregate and inflation– a consequence of the devel-
opment of financial markets and of the progress made in
macroeconomic stabilisation– two factors that led to a rise in money
demand (OECD Economic Surveys, Poland, January 2000).  
In September 1998, the NBP adopted a new monetary policy
framework: monetary targeting was replaced by inflation targeting.
Before that date, to a large extent the central bank was trying to pursue
two objectives (a monetary target and an exchange-rate anchor) with
only one instrument, which frequently led to monetary dilemmas.  A
common dilemma occurred when the central bank had to intervene on
the foreign exchange market to prevent an appreciation of the exchange
rate, but at the same time had to take action to bring money supply
within the announced target.  To achieve the two objectives simulta-
neously, the central bank had to resort to large-scale sterilisation
operations, which were costly for the banking system and increasingly
difficult to put in place.  A new framework was therefore required to
re-organise the priorities of monetary policy and limit the number of
objectives.  The direct inflation targeting was accompanied in early 1999
by a considerable widening in the exchange-rate fluctuation band, to
+/-15%.  The crawling rate of the central parity in the fluctuation band
was progressively reduced from 1% per month in early-1997 to 0.3%
in March 1999, so that the inflation objective could be achieved more
easily.  Since April 2000, Poland has been under a fully-floating
exchange-rate regime.  After some difficulties in curbing inflation at the
opening of the new millennium, the inflation rate now seems more or
less under control (Table 3).  The NBP attributes the past difficulties
to the combined effect of three factors: first, considerable fluctuations
in fuel and foodstuffs prices; second, considerable lags in the monetary
policy transmission mechanism6; and third, an over-expansionary fiscal
policy (NBP, 2003).  As a result, the monetary authorities of Poland
implemented a tight monetary policy between 1999 and 2002, at the
expense of real economic growth (Table 3).
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6. The time lag for the maximum reaction of the inflation rate to a change in interest rates
by NBP is about 18 months (NBP, 2003).
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The mismatching of monetary and fiscal policies is clear, in retro-
spect.  Since 2001, the general government deficit has risen to levels
of around 5% of GDP.  Combined with a considerable slowdown in
privatisation, this has led to a rapid surge in the public debt from 42.5%
in 2000 to over 48% in 2002 (Table 3).  According to Golik and
Jedrzejowicz (2003), such a drift in public deficits has its roots in the
reform of 1999 consisting of four packages: pensions, decentralisation,
health care and education.  Although real GDP growth remained fairly
high at 4.0% in 2000, domestic demand was subdued, as monetary
policy was aimed at cooling off the overheating Polish economy.  This
slowdown in demand translated into lower revenues from indirect taxes
while reforms led to a significant increase in central budget expendi-
tures.  In particular, the share of fixed items in total expenditures grew
from 20.7% in 1997 to 32.4% in 2002, limiting the scope for discre-
tionary fiscal policy and the potential for rationalising spending to free
up funds for economic-growth-conducive purposes (Golik and
Jedrzejowicz, 2003).  Consequently, GDP growth was restricted to 1%
in 2001 and 1.3% in 2002 (Table 3).  Since then, monetary conditions
have been relaxed under the impulse of interest-rate cuts and Zloty
depreciation, driving the Polish economic recovery without inflationary
pressures, due to the lagged effects of previously tight monetary policy.
As regards fiscal policy, new expansionary budgetary proposals made
by the government in summer 2003 (especially a corporate tax cut from
27% to 19% and higher current expenditures in addition to outlays
related to EU accession) made it possible to assume a deficit of 5-7%
of GDP for 2004.  A medium-term plan proposes spending cuts that
would come into force in 2005, but its credibility is uncertain given
elections scheduled for 2004 (OECD, 2003).  
2. Data and methodological issues
In our first-step bivariate decompositions, we consider the log of
the price level, pt, measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), and
the log of the real exchange rate, qt.  The latter is the CPI-based real
effective exchange rate index, that is, the relative price of domestic
goods in terms of foreign goods.  The data are monthly observations
from 1992:12 to 2002:12 taken from OECD while CPI data are taken
from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF.  
In order properly to specify the VAR, we test for unit roots,
stationarity, and cointegration.  Table 4 presents the augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP), and cointegration test
statistics.  The maximum lag in the ADF test is specified using the
general-to-specific procedure (Hall, 1994).  Starting from a maximum
lag of 16, the lag length is pared down depending on the significance
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of the last coefficient.  In testing for a unit root, we consider the possi-
bility of a linear trend in price levels.  The ADF test statistics indicate
that a unit root (non-stationarity) cannot be rejected for real exchange
rates and prices.  PP tests in Table 4 confirm that stationarity can be
rejected at conventional significance levels.  Thus, both tests indicate
that the real-exchange-rate and price levels are non-stationary, which is
a necessary condition for cointegration.  We have also checked that
both variables for the three countries were integrated of order one.
Table 4 also presents the two-step test for cointegration.  In the first
step, the real exchange rate is regressed on a constant and the price
level.  Then, the residuals are tested for unit roots using an ADF test.
The test statistics in Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic indicate that
the price level and the real exchange rate are not cointegrated; hence,
a VAR in first difference is appropriate.  
In what follows, we will also consider other decompositions,
including industrial productions (IP) and nominal short-term interest
rates (IRS).  Data for industrial production are monthly and seasonally
adjusted; they incorporate total industrial activities except construction.
Data are taken from the OECD.  As noted by Korhonen (2003), indus-
trial production data are still more precisely measured than those for
many other sectors of the economy.  Moreover, the data fit better for
explaining real-exchange-rate fluctuations since industrial production
excluding construction is more open to international trade than private
services, for instance.  Data for the nominal interest rates are taken
from the IMF.  Tests for stationarity are also reported in Table 4.  Unit
roots can generally be rejected at the 5% critical level.  To test for the
cointegration between the real effective exchange rate, price level,
industrial production and nominal interest rate, we use the same
procedure as for the two-variable cointegration.  The stationarity of
residuals can be rejected at the 5% critical level.  A VAR in first
difference for these four variables is also appropriate.
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Following D-K (2001), we will first consider two types of orthogonal
shocks, each of which could be a source of variation in the observed
movements in real exchange rates and prices.  A supply shock, est,
reflects changes in endowment, productivity shocks and technology
while a nominal demand shock, endt, is caused by nominal money supply
shocks or devaluation/depreciation of the exchange rate.  Because the
vector ∆Xt = [∆qt ,∆pt]’ is stationary, it can be written as an infinite
moving average in the structural shocks (est ,endt):
∆qt          est∆pt
= A endt 
, (1)
A11 (L) A12 (L)
where A = A21 (L) A22 (L) 
and Aij are polynomials in the lag operator, L.  
In order to identify the shocks within the bivariate SVAR, and
following D-K (2001), it is assumed that nominal demand shocks have
no long-run effect on the real effective exchange rate.  This assumption
draws on perfect price flexibility at least in the long run: a depreci-
ation/appreciation of the nominal exchange rate would not influence
the real exchange rate as prices would fully adjust.  
Nevertheless, reliance on long-run restrictions might be detrimental
to the understanding of short-run economic dynamics in these
economies, confronted with a plague of goods whose prices have been
long administered.  Assuming perfect price flexibility, though the
previous situation has largely changed (as our results will testify), is
exaggerated.  
Within the multivariate SVAR, we consider the following vector 
∆Zt = [∆yt ,∆pt ,∆it ,∆qt] and will adopt short-run identifying restric-
tions7.  The data vector has been chosen so that the most exogenous
series are preceding the most endogenous ones (Sims, 1980).  The
following equations summarise our identification scheme:
= (2)
Jérôme Creel and Sandrine Levasseur
98
Special issue/April 2004
7. Identifying long-run restrictions have been also introduced and VAR estimations performed.
We have introduced the same restrictions as in Canzoneri et al. (1996), though adapted to a 4-
variable rather than a 3-variable VAR.  We have assumed that (i) the nominal shocks, financial
shocks and fiscal shocks had no long-run effect on the real effective exchange rate; (ii) neither
the nominal shocks nor the financial shocks had a long-run effect on the industrial production;
and (iii) the financial shock had no long-run impact on the inflation rate.  We have checked that,
in this framework, we could reach the same qualitative conclusions regarding the IRFs of REER
and inflation rate after either a supply shock or a nominal shock, as in a 2-variable system.  Details
are available from the authors upon request.
e∆y
e∆p
e∆i
e∆q
u∆y
u∆p
u∆i
u∆q
a11 0    0   0
a21 a22 0   0
a31  a32  a33 0
a41  a42 a43  a44
where e∆y e∆p e∆i e∆q are the structural disturbances, that is fiscal
shocks, nominal shocks, monetary policy (or financial) shocks and supply
shocks, respectively; and u∆y u∆p u∆i u∆q are the residuals in the reduced
form equations, which represent unexpected movements (given infor-
mation in the system) of each variable.
Identifying short-run restrictions have been linked to the expecta-
tions framework, and variables are ordered from the most
backward-looking to the most forward-looking.  It has thus been
assumed that, in the short run, industrial production was exogenous;
prices depend on expectations of industrial production8; the nominal
interest rate depends on forward-looking expectations regarding indus-
trial production and prices9; and the real effective exchange rate is
assumed to depend strongly on the contemporaneous nominal
exchange rate.  As the latter is a forward-looking asset, it is then
assumed that all variables have contemporaneous effects on the
exchange rate.  
We have considered that these short-run restrictions, based upon
common knowledge of expectations regarding either the nominal
exchange rate, the nominal short-run interest rate, or the inflation rate,
were less debatable than long-run restrictions.  The latter are generally
the reminiscence of dichotomist macroeconomic theories, like the
Quantity theory, although a prominent literature is now devoted to the
interactions between monetary and fiscal policies, and their joint long-
run effects on nominal and real variables.  The Fiscal theory of the price
level (Woodford, 2001) can be invoked in this respect, for instance.  
3. Empirical results with a bivariate VAR
A finite-order bivariate vector auto-regressive model (VAR) is
estimated for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.  The VARs have
been pared down to 1 lag following the Schwarz information criterion10.
In order to examine the possibility of exogenous shifts in the variables
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8. This specification could be more or less related to the so-called hybrid Phillips curve which,
following Calvo (1983), would make private inflation expectations backward- and forward-looking.
9. Levin et al. (2003) argue that a robust monetary policy rule should respond to a one-year-
ahead forecast of inflation and to the current output gap.  But Laxton and Pesenti (2003) show
that, in a calibrated model for the Euro area and the Czech Republic, adopting a rule which
responds more strongly to inflation forecasts would prove more efficient.  Adopting a monetary
policy rule which would respond to a one-month-ahead forecast of, respectively, inflation and
industrial production, as is implicit in the short-run restrictions of the SVAR, would possibly give
the same favourable outcomes since future industrial production is a key determinant of future
inflation.
10. Though VARs generally include more lags, we have checked that reliance on a single lag
did not lead to non-robust conclusions.  More noteworthy, no significant “price puzzle” has
emerged from adopting a single lag within the multivariate VAR.  We also thank Guillaume
Chevillon for having made clear to us that, according to Johansen, lags in a VAR should be kept
to a minimum.
and regime changes, we have also tested for the significance of period
and policy-specific dummies, as in D-K (2001).  
First, for the three countries under study, the Asian and Russian
crises from 1997 to 1998 may have influenced the time path of the
endogenous variables.  Second, the implementation of different
exchange-rate and monetary regimes is also considered.  Table 5 reports
the definitions of the various dummies.  Only those significant at the
5% critical level for at least one endogenous variable have been kept
in the estimation.  Since exchange-rate regimes and monetary (inflation-
targeting) regimes are very likely to be closely linked, they have never
been tested for simultaneously (d2 and d5, for example, in the case of
the Czech Republic).
The Asian and Russian crises dummy is not significant for either
country.  This result is consistent with the findings of D-K (2001).  In
the same manner, the dummy for the monetary regime is not signif-
icant for either country.  By contrast, the exchange-rate regime matters:
the dummy for the exchange-rate regime is significant for the three
countries, especially with respect to the inflation rate.  Hence, in the
final VAR, we include d2, d3 and d4, in order to control for the shift
in the exchange-rate regime in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland,
respectively.
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5. Definitions of Period or Regime-Specific dummies
Asian and Russian crises: d1 = 1 between 1997:5 and 1998:8, 0 otherwise.
Exchange rate regimes of the Czech Republic: d2
Peg 1993:1-1996:1 = 0,
Large bands 1996:2-1997:4 = 1,
Managed flexible exchange rate 1997:5-2002:11, = 2.
Exchange rate regimes of Hungary: d3
Fixed 1993:1-1995:2, = 0,
Narrow bands 1995:3-2001:9, = 1,
Large bands 2001:10-2002:11, = 2.
Exchange rate regimes of Poland: d4
Crawling peg 1993:1-1995:4 = 0,
Crawling band 1995:5-2000:3, = 1,
Flexible exchange rate 2000:4-2002:11, = 2.
Inflation targeting of the Czech Republic: d5 = 1 between 1998:1 and 2002:11,
0 otherwise.
Inflation targeting of Hungary: d6 = 1 between 2001:6 and 2002:11, 0 otherwise.
Inflation targeting of Poland: d7 = 1 between 1998: 9 and 2002: 11, 0 otherwise.
3.1. The theoretical framework
Though VARs are a-theoretical, the inclusion of restrictions in the
structural VARs (SVARs) leads one to expect some typical variations in
the endogenous variables after a shock.  
The implicit framework for the bivariate SVAR hinges on the
Mundell-Fleming model with flexible prices.  Three basic elements in
the impulse response functions (IRFs) to a structural shock are of
importance: the length of the discrepancy vis-à-vis the initial situation,
its sign and its significance.
First, consider a supply shock, which is assumed to be a positive
shock on productivity.  A transitory impact on the real effective
exchange rate will reflect the capacity of the terms of trade to absorb
the shock, hence a high degree of domestic price flexibility in the short
run.  As a consequence, one can argue that expansionary monetary
policies are inefficient in that they are only inflationary.  But the reverse
may also be true: restrictive monetary policies may be quite efficient
in curbing inflation.  To be confirmed, such a conclusion necessitates
that a nominal shock has a low impact on other real variables in the
short run (e.g. production).  A transitory impact of supply shocks on
real variables may also reveal that expansionary fiscal policy could be
fettered by the flexibility of prices and may have an inflationary effect.
The latter could be also confirmed by the impact of a real demand
shock on inflation.  If now, the impact of a supply shock on the REER
is persistent, the flexibility of the price level can be questioned and
policies may be more efficient than in the previous situation.  As for
the sign of the impact, a positive supply shock is expected to have a
negative impact on prices, unless the productivity growth is overstated
by wage increases that fuel domestic inflation.  This may reveal the
existence of a so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect.  
Second, consider a positive nominal demand shock and assume it
has no impact on the REER in the long run.  In the short run however,
nominal-exchange-rate depreciation is supposed to provoke an
improvement in the terms of trade, hence a depreciation in the REER.
The transitory improvement in the terms of trade should provoke a
progressive rise in the price level, unless at least one of the following
situations occurs: (i) prices are sticky; (ii) monetary policy counters the
inflationary impact of the shock (in the case of an efficient inflation-
targeting policy); (iii) fiscal policy is restrictive.  Testing for the
significance of the two latter assumptions is possible within the multi-
variate SVAR.  
Finally, analytic confidence intervals of the IRFs for the bivariate
SVAR have been performed via our own computations.  After trans-
forming the SVAR representation:
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Yt =Σ Bi,t (L)Yt + et , with et = Aut and ut ~ Niid (3)
into a VAR using the estimated A matrix in equation (1):
Xt =Σ A-1Bi,t(L)AXt + A-1 et , with Xt = A-1Yt, (4)
we have multiplied the standard deviations of the IRFs of the VAR
system  in (4), obtained under the Eviews software, to matrix A of the
SVAR system in (3) since, by construction, the variance of the estimated
SVAR representation can be written as:
Var Yt+1 t = AVar Xt+1 t A’.  (5)
The choice of analytic confidence intervals has been driven by its
closeness to the bands of the VAR system in (4) which were computed
by bootstrapping techniques (Hall, 1992) using the JMulti software11.
3.2 First empirical outcomes
The dynamic paths of the real exchange rate and price level can be
explored by examining the IRFs of the SVARs.  Figure 1 (appendix II)
presents the IRFs of the two endogenous variables to the supply and
nominal demand shocks, respectively, for the three countries under study.  
We begin with the supply shock.  Let us briefly summarise the
empirical results in D-K (2001, p.271).  In Hungary and Poland, the
impact of the shock is permanent on the REER, which tends to reveal
high price rigidity even in the long run.  The sole difference between
countries lies in the response of the price level: while the increase is
permanent in Hungary, prices respond cyclically and converge towards
zero in Poland.  
Our empirical results do not support the view of high price rigidity
in the three countries under study, most notably in the Czech Republic
and in Hungary, where the impact of the shock on the REER is
transitory.  The response of the REER to a (1%) supply shock in these
two countries converges towards zero 3 and 4 months, respectively,
after the shock.  Also noteworthy, in the short run, the responses to
the shock for the three countries are quite high (+1.5% on average for
the three countries).  As regards the inflation responses to the shock,
these are initially positive in the three countries, and become negative
in the second month (Czech Republic and Hungary) or remain positive
until the effect vanishes (Poland).  
This persistent Polish positive response to the shock can be
attributed to the presence of a Balassa-Samuelson effect.  A more
prominent effect of this kind in Poland, in comparison with the Czech
Republic and Hungary, has also been reported in Egert (2002).
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11. See JMulti, http://ise.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/oekonometrie/.
Moreover, Table 6 shows that real wage growth in the Polish business
sector has been quite high since 1994.  Though this is not a direct
evidence of the B-S effect, the underlying wage-price dynamics under
way in Poland could well explain the positive impact of the supply shock
on the price level.
Turning to the effects of a (positive) nominal demand shock,
responses reported in D-K (2001) are initially a quite substantial depre-
ciation in the REER, followed by an appreciation towards the pre-shock
level.  Prices increase linearly and permanently after the shock.  
In our setting, the responses to a nominal demand shock are quite
different from that reported in D-K (2001), most notably as regards
the inflation dynamics.  In the Czech Republic and Poland, the initial
REER depreciation is low, whereas in Hungary the shock induces a real
appreciation.  This appreciation is in part due to the substantial increase
in inflation (+0.8%, to be compared with +0.7% and +0.5% in Poland
and the Czech Republic respectively) which dies away less rapidly than
in the two other countries and thus pushes the terms of trade
downwards.  The real appreciation in Hungary is followed, first, by a
depreciation and, second, by a return towards the pre-shock level after
5 months.  
The response of inflation to the nominal demand shock, qualitatively
similar from one country to another, tends to confirm high price flexi-
bility in the three countries under study.  The immediate rise may reveal
the lower importance of administered prices in these three countries.
This is confirmed in the case of the Czech Republic and even more
importantly in the case of Poland (see Table AI.1 in the appendix I).
The Hungarian case is more awkward in that the share of administered
prices has risen since the early 1990s.  Nevertheless, comparing the
degrees of openness of the three economies under study can explain
both why the response of inflation is higher in Hungary than in the
Czech Republic and Poland, and also the difference in sign concerning
the response of REER following a positive nominal demand shock (i.e.
appreciation in Hungary, depreciation in the two others).  Indeed,
Hungary exhibits a higher degree of openness than the Czech Republic
and even more than Poland (Table AI.2 in the appendix I).  As a result,
the nominal depreciation in the exchange rate due to the nominal
positive demand shock may be followed by stronger and faster
imported inflation in Hungary than in the other countries and explain
the initial opposite response of REER.  Finally, the immediate rise in the
response of prices may also reveal the substantial progress made by
these three economies towards a market economy, hence confirming
the conclusions of Halpern and Wyplosz (1997)12.  The private sector
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12. Paukert (1997) noted that, as early as 1994, the privatisation process in the Czech Republic
had already been a success, most notably as regards restitutions and small-scale privatisations
which had not been detrimental to employment and could have therefore fuelled wage claims.
share in GDP is remarkably high in 2001 in relation to the situation
prevailing almost ten years before, when this share was a mere 50%.
It is now up to 75 to 80% in the three countries (EBRD, 2002), with
Hungary at this peak since 1998, hence somewhat earlier than in the
Czech Republic (1999) or Poland (2001).  
One question, at least, remains on the efficiency of economic
policies.  Do these preliminary results indicate that monetary and
exchange-rate policies are inflationary, so that they may be considered
either inefficient or adequate to another goal, for instance growth? Or
rather, should we infer from these preliminary results that monetary
and exchange-rate policies aiming at curbing inflation and improving
competitiveness would be very efficient13? 
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13. OECD (2000, p.27) notes that, in the Czech Republic, the price behaviour since 1996
has been heavily influenced by exchange-rate changes.
14. Details are available from the authors upon request.
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Czech Republic 7.4 9.2 8.2 2.9 0.3 4.9 3.8     n.a. 
Hungary* 3.9 – 6.6 – 0.3 3.0 3.7 4.4 4.0 6.5 
Poland n.a. 3.4     n.a. 5.7 3.8 3.1 1.2 1.5 
6. Real Wage Developments, 1994 to 2001
Annual percentage changes, business sector
*: Nominal wage growth taken from the OECD Hungary Economic Survey 2001-2002; CPI inflation rate taken
from the National Bank of Hungary; and real wage growth computed by the authors.
Sources: OECD Economic Surveys, various issues.
Beforehand, however, the puzzle resulting from deep differences
between our results and Dibooglu and Kutan’s deserves particular
attention.  We have thus replicated the estimations by D-K using the
same data source (IMF for both variables) and the same sample (1990:1-
1999:3).  First, we have chosen the same number of lags (12) although
it matched neither the Schwarz nor Akaike information criterion.
Second, we have changed the number of lags (1) so that it could satisfy
the Schwarz information criterion.  
When searching the same IRFs as those presented and commented
in D-K (2001), we were surprised by the need to perform accumulated
IRFs14.  This is a crucial point as it leads to very different conclusions
on price behaviour: where D-K (2001) conclude in favour of price
rigidity because accumulated IRFs persistently deviate from the initial
steady state, we conclude in favour of price flexibility as IRFs are high
in the short run but die away very rapidly.
The price features we emphasise are also confirmed when the VAR
by D-K is pared down to one lag.  As shown in figure 2 (appendix II),
qualitative results in Hungary and Poland for the two shocks do not
depend on the chosen sample period.  It is also worth noting that with
a sample that disregards the early years of transition (bold line), the
response of inflation to a supply shock exhibits less Balassa-Samuelson
effect in Poland than if these early years are taken into account.  The
reverse is true in the case of Hungary.  Comparisons also show that a
nominal shock has a lower impact on inflation in both countries when
early years are dropped: this may testify to a more efficient monetary
policy aiming at curbing inflation.  Finally, the immediate real appreci-
ation in Hungary after a nominal demand shock is lower with than
without the early transition years, possibly due to a lower degree of
openness towards developed countries in the beginning of transition.  A
large discrepancy vis-à-vis expected outcomes, though deviations of the
inflation rate are higher with than without these early years, would be
puzzling, unless the inflation targeting strategy implemented since 2001
has proven efficient and the nominal exchange rate has been very flexible. 
4. Further analyses after incorporating fiscal
and financial shocks
Issues regarding the efficiency of economic policies lie at the heart
of our understanding of what drives REER and inflation-rate fluctua-
tions in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.  Adopting a larger
set of variables into a SVAR analysis should therefore prove useful.
Using a decomposition featuring the REER, inflation rate, industrial
production and nominal short-run interest rate will make it possible to
evaluate the incidence of real demand (fiscal) shocks and monetary
policy (financial) shocks on the REER: do unexpected shocks on public
expenditures have a persistent impact on the competitiveness of
countries under study? Are they compensated by an active nominal-
exchange-rate policy, in which case the entry into the ERM II would
make these countries incur large costs?  And what will be the
cost/benefit trade-off consecutive to the renunciation of some
monetary and fiscal activism or fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate?
As in the previous SVAR model, the new decomposition accepts
dummies related to the shifts in the exchange-rate regime.  They are
thus incorporated in the SVARs.  The Schwarz information criterion
gave us one lag for the three countries.  As already mentioned above,
short-run restrictions have been incorporated.  
IRFs are presented in Figure 3 (appendix II).  It is worth noting that
a nominal demand shock now provokes an immediate appreciation in
the REER not only in Hungary but also in the Czech Republic and
Poland.  Reasons for this common reaction are different from one
country to the other, though.  
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In the Czech Republic, this real appreciation can be partly due to a
passive monetary policy: the short-term interest rate decreases though
the inflation rate rises, but this explanation also needs to be coupled
with a low sensitivity of the nominal exchange rate to the interest rate
and inflation rate.  
In Poland, the nominal exchange rate appears more sensitive to
monetary policy than in the Czech Republic: the increase in the nominal
short-run interest rate tends to re-appreciate the nominal exchange
rate.  Meanwhile, the terms of trade decrease.  The strength with which
the Polish monetary policy responds to the nominal demand shock is
unique among the three countries under study and it is efficient in
reducing both internal and imported inflation.  
In Hungary, the real appreciation could be attributable to a very
forward-looking monetary policy.  Though price increases in Hungary
persist over a longer period than in the Czech Republic and, to a lesser
extent, in Poland, the Hungarian monetary policy is mute.  But another
explanation can emerge: monetary policy is not efficient in curbing
inflation, and its main goal could be found elsewhere, namely on the
real side of the economy.  Indeed, after a financial shock, the impact
on inflation is nil whereas industrial production is reduced.  We could
then infer from this that monetary policy was targeting nominal GDP
rather than the inflation rate.  
The small reduction in industrial production after a nominal demand
shock also legitimises the absence of interest-rate hikes, so that we are
inclined to favour the hypothesis that Hungarian monetary policy has
long targeted the nominal GDP and that the conversion of the National
Bank of Hungary to effective inflation targeting is very recent15.  Finally,
IRFs also show that a fiscal shock in Hungary has a very low impact on
the inflation rate.  Moreover, its impact on industrial production is
positive though transitory, and the REER does not much react to this
type of shock.  Price and relative exchange-rate flexibility, coupled with
a growth-oriented fiscal policy, are the important features of the
economic policy framework in Hungary.  
But where does the increasing trend in the Hungarian REER during
the transition years thus come from?  The B-S effect does not seem to
work: after correcting the IRFs for the interactions of monetary and
fiscal policies, a supply shock no longer leads to a sharp rise in the
inflation rate, a rise over which we had elaborated on the B-S effect in
the preceding section16.  One explanation for the positive trend in the
REER, based on the fundamentals of the economy, thus lies in the wage-
prices dynamics, independently from the B-S effect.  Except in 1995 and
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15. Official conversion dates June 2001.
16. Recall that the reduction in the inflation rate following the supply shock had been expected
provided the B-S effect was low.
1996, real wage increases in Hungary have been quite high (see Table 6)
pushing the real exchange rate upwards.  Finally, increases in the nominal
interest rates, despite costs in terms of lower economic growth (see
figure 3, appendix II), could have helped to reduce the REER but only
through a puzzling mechanism: a high interest rate would not have
reduced inflation but would have depreciated the currency (figure 3),
thus questioning the credibility of Hungarian monetary policy17.  
The efficiency of monetary policy may also be questioned in the
case of the Czech Republic.  A financial shock has basically no impact
on inflation and only leads to a real depreciation (figure 3), but contrary
to Hungary, industrial production is not sensitive to monetary policy.
In the case of the Czech Republic, the low monetary policy efficiency
in curbing the Czech inflation should be attributed to the (continuing)
sluggishness of domestic credit.  In this country, the long-term banking
depression, culminating in a major crisis in 1997/1998, has considerably
limited the liquidity of financial institutions up to now (Musilek, 2003;
OECD, 2002).  The transmission channels of monetary policy towards
the real economy are therefore fragile and probably inefficient.  
We mentioned earlier that monetary policy in Poland responded
toughly to a nominal demand shock, from which we concluded that this
policy served to curb inflation dynamics downward.  Now, a financial
shock in Poland has a positive impact on the inflation rate.  How can
these two apparently opposite features coexist?  The answer may lie
in the expectations framework.  An unexpected shock on monetary
policy would temporarily deteriorate the terms of trade and lead to
higher inflation, whereas an expected monetary policy would reduce
inflation.  It may testify to a higher credibility of the Polish monetary
policy, in comparison with the Czech Republic or Hungary.
Confirmation of the credibility and efficiency of monetary policy in
Poland can be twofold: first, as shown in figure 3 (appendix II) , after
a nominal demand shock the response of the Polish REER is consistent
with a change in the nominal effective exchange rate, which has been
driven by the increase in the nominal interest rate.  Second, monetary
policy responds to fiscal policy in order to compensate for its transitory
inflationary impact (shock 1 in Poland, figure 3): where fiscal policy
proves relatively inflationary, monetary policy proves definitely anti-infla-
tionary.  This substitutability between fiscal and monetary policy in
Poland is not found in the Czech Republic where IRFs consecutive to
a fiscal shock testify to a negative correlation between fiscal spending
and the nominal interest rate.  Economic policies in the Czech Republic
could therefore be labelled “complementary”.  This may be at the heart
of the immediate real appreciation in this country.
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17. This latter explanation does not appear to fit the very recent interest-rate transmission
mechanism in Hungary: increases in interest rates induce nominal appreciation of the exchange
rate, which in turn has a disinflationary effect.
Finally, developments on the relative efficiency of economic policies
in the three countries under study should not hide the fact that the
very transitory impact of a supply shock on the REER is robust to the
4-variable model.  Contrary to D-K (2001), one must conclude in favour
of high flexibility in price dynamics and thus disregard price inertia.
5. Conclusion: policy implications
The EU enlargement towards eight CEECs in May 2004 still raises
questions about the optimal road for adopting the Euro.  Unilateral
euroisation has been largely debated in the recent years, with some
countries like Poland having envisaged unilateral abandonment of their
currency in favour of the Euro (see Levasseur, 2004).  However, the
biggest incomers to the EU, among them Poland, have recently adopted
a flexible exchange-rate regime.  The entry into ERM II or the Euro
area may thus have huge consequences for their economic policies,
encompassing exchange-rate policy, but also for economic growth and
the inflation path.  
A first step of our work has consisted in a review of the monetary
and fiscal policies in the largest incomers, namely the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland.  Capital inflows within fixed exchange-rate
regimes– which led to real-exchange-rate appreciations and to a
consecutive loss of competitiveness and a worsening of the current
account– might explain the shift to a more flexible exchange-rate regime
in the three countries.
A second step has been devoted to a replication of D-K (2001)
methodology to the three countries in order to evaluate their degree
of price flexibility.  Contrary to D-K (2001), impulse response functions
show a very high degree of flexibility in the CPI, which reveals the
lower importance of administered prices in the Czech Republic and
Poland, and the substantial progress made by the three economies
towards a market economy.
A third step has been devoted to an extension of D-K (2001) to a
multivariate VAR incorporating industrial production and the nominal
short-run interest rate (as a proxy for monetary policy).  We have been
able to refine the results obtained with a bivariate decomposition.  Most
noteworthy, Poland seems a rather particular country as regards the
use of monetary and fiscal policies, in comparison with the Czech
Republic and Hungary.  First, fiscal policy is not inflationary.  This is the
consequence of a specific policy mix, under which monetary policy
would be restrictive when fiscal policy would be expansionary.  The
former would be aimed at curbing inflation while the latter would boost
growth.  Second, exchange-rate policy in Poland seems to have been
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more active than in the other two countries.  In contrast to the Czech
Republic and Hungary, nominal shocks appear to have a strong and
persistent effect on the Polish REER.  
These results have strong policy implications.  First, in the three
countries, high price flexibility, though a rather new phenomenon, surely
puts them in line with countries already in the EU.  This means that
the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy in the three countries
are converging towards the EU standards.  
Second, there are still some intriguing responses of the price level
to a supply shock.  We showed evidence that the Balassa-Samuelson
effect should not be overstated and that one should rather turn towards
some uncontrolled wage-price spiral.  Adopting a fixed exchange-rate
regime, like the ERM II, will necessitate that real wage hikes are brought
to an end, otherwise competitiveness will be largely impaired.  
Third, this should be all the more true in the case of Poland, as this
country has benefited substantially from the fluctuations of the nominal
exchange rate to compensate for the real-exchange-rate appreciation
in the past.  Thus, adopting a firmly fixed exchange-rate regime in Poland
seems rather problematic.  The use of its fiscal policy would also be
fettered by the dispositions of the Stability and Growth Pact, though
the impact of a fiscal shock is rather short (ending up after 6 months,
at best).  Unless monetary policy in Europe is optimal to the Polish
economy, the cost of participating in the EU might be quite high for
this country and, at least, higher than in the case of the Czech Republic
or Hungary.
A puzzle remains, though.  The REER in the three countries do not
move for long after a shock has occurred, be it a nominal demand, real
demand, financial or supply one.  The long-lasting positive trend in the
REER of these transition economies would therefore be explained,
either by a succession of shocks all through the transition years, or by
noise and speculative trends which our framework has been unable to
model.  This latter question is left to future research.
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AI.2. Degree of openness
In % of GDP, 2000
Exportations Importations
Czech Republic 54.7 59.6
Hungary 58.3 64.4
Poland 18.1 25.2
Source: European Parliament.
APPENDIX I
Degree of price liberalisation in the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
Price liberalisation is still continuing in the Czech Republic while it
is almost fully implemented in Poland. In this latter country, the share
of administered prices is now very close to zero (table AI.1 below). In
the Czech Republic, 12 % of prices were still administered in 2001, to
be compared with a 18 %-share 6 years earlier. Hungary is a remarkable
country as regards the share of regulated prices which still amounted
to 18 % of the consumer price index (CPI) in 2001. It is also worth
noticing that this share follows a positive trend since only 11 % of prices
were administered in 1993. Despite this evolution, the EBRD index of
price liberalisation is the same for Hungary and Poland, which should
testify to the “good” evolution of the Hungarian economy towards a
market economy.
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AI.1. Share of administered prices in CPI
In %
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Czech Republic 17.9 18.1 17.4 17.4 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 12.4
Hungary 10.8 11.8 12.9 12.8 15.9 17.0 18.2 18.3 18.5
Poland 10.6 12.0 12.0 11.6 10.6 10.6 9.0 2.6 1.2
Source: EBRD, 2002.
APPENDIX II
HOW WOULD A FIXED-EXCHANGE-RATE REGIME FIT THE TRANSITION ECONOMIES?
113
Special issue/April 2004
-0,005
0
0,005
0,01
0,015
0,02
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-0,002
-0,001
0
0,001
0,002
0,003
0,004
0,005
0,006
0,007
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-0,003
-0,002
-0,001
0
0,001
0,002
0,003
0,004
0,005
0,006
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-0,005
-0,004
-0,003
-0,002
-0,001
0
0,001
0,002
0,003
0,004
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 1a. Czech Republic
Impulse response functions to a structural shock
N.B.: IRFs with (analytic) confidence intervals.
Response of the RER in difference to Shock 1 Response of the RER in difference to Shock 2
Response of the inflation rate to Shock 1 Response of the inflation rate to Shock 2
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Figure 1b. Hungary
Impulse response functions to a structural shock
N.B.: IRFs with (analytic) confidence intervals.
Response of the RER in difference to Shock 1 Response of the RER in difference to Shock 2
Response of the inflation rate to Shock 1 Response of the inflation rate to Shock 2
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Figure 1c. Poland
Impulse response functions to a structural shock
N.B.: IRFs with (analytic) confidence intervals.
Response of the RER in difference to Shock 1 Response of the RER in difference to Shock 2
Response of the inflation rate to Shock 1 Response of the inflation rate to Shock 2
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Figure 2a. Hungary
Impulse response functions to a structural shock
A comparison with D-K former results (sample 1990:1-1999:3)
0
0,002
0,004
0,006
0,008
0,01
0,012
0,014
0,016
0,018
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Smpl 1993:1- 2002:11
Smpl 1990:1- 1999:3
0
0,002
0,004
0,006
0,008
0,01
0,012
0,014
0,016
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Smpl 1993:1- 2002:11
Smpl 1990:1- 1999:3
-0,001
-0,0005
0
0,0005
0,001
0,0015
0,002
0,0025
0,003
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Smpl 1993:1- 2002:11
Smpl 1990:1- 1999:3
Response of the RER in difference to Shock 1 Response of the RER in difference to Shock 2
Response of the inflation rate to Shock 1 Response of the inflation rate to Shock 2
-0,001
-0,0005
0
0,0005
0,001
0,0015
0,002
0,0025
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Smpl 1993:1- 2002:11
Smpl 1990:1- 1999:3
HOW WOULD A FIXED-EXCHANGE-RATE REGIME FIT THE TRANSITION ECONOMIES?
117
Special issue/April 2004
Figure 2b. Poland
Impulse response functions to a structural shock
A comparison with D-K former results (sample 1990:1-1999:3)
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Figure 3a. Czech Republic 
Impulse response functions to a structural shock
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations + 2 S.E.
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Figure 3b. Hungary
Impulse response functions to a structural shock
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations + 2 S.E.
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Figure 3C. Poland
Impulse response functions to a structural shock
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations + 2 S.E.
